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SPLIT OVER SEX: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS AND
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES SPLIT OVER SEXUAL
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
Darria Turner+
Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be unlawful
for public and private employers with 15 or more employees “to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .”1 Since its enactment, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
definitively stated whether sex discrimination based on sexual orientation is
protected under Title VII. Because Congress and the Supreme Court have not
explicitly provided for its protection, claims of sex discrimination based on
sexual orientation are generally not cognizable under Title VII.2 For this reason,
many courts have routinely held that the protections of Title VII do not extend
to claims based on sexual orientation discrimination.3 Recently however, three
circuits were faced with claims of sex discrimination based on sexual orientation
and were compelled to decide whether to follow or reverse court precedent and
allow discrimination claims based on sexual orientation to be heard.4
In March 2017, in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital,5 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled 2-1 that Title VII does not cover discrimination based on sexual
orientation. It held that binding precedent in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,6 which
established that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . .
. [,]” foreclosed such an action.7 In April 2017, the Second Circuit also held that
sexual orientation was not covered under Title VII in Zarda v. Altitude Express,
+
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e-17 (2012).
2. CHARLES R. RICHEY, 1 MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS § 1:64 (2018).
3. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by, 883
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2017);
Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017).
4. See Zarda, 855 F.3d at 79–80; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll.
of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017).
5. 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017).
6. 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
7. Id. at 1255 (quoting Blum, 597 F.2d at 938).
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Inc.8 However, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,9 after a
rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit held that Title VII does provide protection
against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Following the Seventh
Circuit’s reversal, the Second Circuit agreed to rehear Zarda en banc, which
overruled its current precedent and added to the circuit split on this issue.10
This split has also created tension between the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).11
These agencies have taken opposing views on the Zarda rehearing.12 The DOJ
argues that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not sex discrimination
under Title VII.13 Conversely, the EEOC argues that “sexual orientation
discrimination is, by definition, discrimination ‘because of . . . sex,’ in violation
of Title VII.”14
This Comment will explore the history of workplace sex discrimination cases
based on sexual orientation under Title VII, how the current circuit split should
be resolved, and the impact these cases will have on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. Part I
will discuss the history and evolution of sex discrimination under Title VII. It
will begin with the enactment of the legislation and then will discuss how
judicial interpretation of sex discrimination has changed through case law and
administrative guidance.
Part II will examine the current circuit split on whether Title VII’s protection
against sex discrimination includes sexual orientation. It will first discuss how
each of the circuits interpret sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII,
then analyze the basis upon which each circuit holds that sexual orientation is or
is not protected by Title VII. Lastly, in Part III, this Comment will argue that
judicial interpretation should evolve to include sexual orientation in cases of
protection from sex discrimination under Title VII. This Comment will argue
that the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is the appropriate
resolution for sexual orientation under Title VII. It will also discuss how the
conflicting arguments from federal agencies, coupled with no guidance from
Congress or the Supreme Court, could potentially lead to a myriad of workplace
discrimination issues if the judiciary fails to resolve the conflict.

8. 855 F.3d 76, 82 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018)
9. 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017).
10. Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82, overruled by, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d
Cir. 2018).
11. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *15–16, *21, Zarda v. Altitide
Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 3775).
12. Id. at 15; En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of Reversal at 22–23, Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC].
13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at 5.

2019]

I.

Split Over Sex

187

WHAT IT MEANS TO BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST “BECAUSE OF . . .
SEX”15
A.

Sex Discrimination is Brought Within Title VII’s Purview

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, prohibits as an “unlawful employment practice,” discrimination
“against any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”16 This legislation began by President John F. Kennedy
making appeals to Congress to enact legislation regarding civil rights.17
President Kennedy’s proposed civil rights legislation sought to emphasize
voting rights, public accommodations, employment discrimination, and
education to counter the “growing moral crisis in American race relations.”18
However, President Kennedy’s concern did not include discrimination because
of sex.19 Yet when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, it
included discrimination “because of . . . sex.”20
Representative Howard Smith introduced the amendment just two days before
the bill moved from the House to the Senate, without prior hearing or debate.21
Smith opposed the civil rights legislation, so adding sex discrimination was his
effort to block it.22 However, his effort failed and sex discrimination fell within
the purview of impermissible actions under Title VII.23 Notably, Representative
Martha Griffith began to advocate for Smith’s amendment because she believed
that not adding “sex” to the bill would leave white women unprotected.24
Following Griffith’s comments, four other representatives also raised the
argument that white women would be left behind.25 This support of Smith’s
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
16. Id.
17. See President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights (Feb.
28, 1963), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9581; see also President John F. Kennedy, Special
Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities (June 19, 1963), www.preside
ncy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9283.
18. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, supra
note 17.
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
21. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (introductory statement of Rep. Smith). Representative
Smith voted against final passage of the bill. See H.R. 7152. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adoption of
a Resolution (H. Res. 789) Providing For House Approval of the Bill as Amended by the Senate.,
GOVTRACK (July 2, 1964), www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/88-1964/h182.
22. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986–87 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that Representative
Smith proposed the amendment as “a last-minute attempt to block the bill”).
23. See 110 CONG. REC. 2804–05.
24. Id. at 2578. Representative Griffith stated that “I rise in support of the amendment
primarily because I feel as a white woman when this bill has passed . . . that white women will be
last at the hiring gate.” Id.
25. Id. at 2583 (statements of Representatives Tuten, Pool, Andrews, and Rivers).
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amendment seemingly interfered with his plan to derail the entire bill.26 The
debate closed and Smith’s amendment passed in the House twice.27 It first
passed by a vote of 168 to 133,28 then by a vote of 290 to 130.29
1.

Congress Fails to Define Scope and Meaning of Sex Discrimination

Since the amendment was included at the tail end of the legislative process,
there is no substantive legislative history defining the scope and meaning of sex
discrimination.30 Though the EEOC has provided little guidance on the
application of “because of sex” within Title VII, one of the reasons Congress
created the EEOC was to interpret and enforce the prohibition of sex
discrimination.31 To enforce these laws, the EEOC was given the authority to
investigate accusations of discrimination against covered employers that are
submitted by an applicant or employee who believes that unlawful
discrimination has occurred.32 The EEOC also provides guidelines on how the
laws and regulations apply.33 Though the guidelines are “not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, [they] do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.”34 However, the EEOC’s initial guidance focused primarily on
protection of the “woman worker.”35 This could be because many of the

26. Id.
27. Id. at 2584, 2804–05.
28. Id. at 2584.
29. Id. at 2804–05.
30. Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986). The Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson noted:
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives. The principal argument in
opposition to the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently different
from other types of discrimination that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment.
This argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with
little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against
discrimination based on “sex.”
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (stating
that “[t]he legislative history of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily
for its brevity”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2012). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
is an independent and bipartisan federal agency that enforces federal laws that make it illegal to
discriminate in the workplace. Id. It is governed by five Commissioners, who are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. Id.
32. See id.
33. EEOC Subregulatory Guidance, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/ind
ex.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
34. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141–42.
35. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,926–27 (Dec. 2, 1965)
(codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604) (listing the Equal Employment Opportunity
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commissioners did not believe that sex categorically was a legitimate addition
to the legislation.36
Consequently, without Congress’s guidance on the definition of “sex” under
Title VII, courts were inclined to interpret it narrowly.37 In many cases, courts
rationalized that Congress’s limited discussion on the “because of sex” provision
meant that Congress had “only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind” when
passing the bill.38 Therefore, courts defined “sex” as biological sex and
interpreted the provision to only prohibit discrimination against biological men
and women for being a man or being a woman.39 Over time, however, courts
began interpreting “sex” in Title VII more broadly.40
B.

Evolution of Discrimination Because of “Sex” Under Title VII

After Title VII’s enactment, cases alleging discrimination because of “sex”
were tried throughout the U.S. court system. The earlier cases tended to focus
on “sex” primarily from a biological standpoint.41 In Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.,42 a female job applicant filed suit under Title VII alleging that she was
discriminated against because of sex. In this case, the employer informed her
that they were not accepting job applications from women with school-aged
children, despite accepting applications from men with school-aged children.43
Commission’s interpretations of Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination in employment because
of sex).
36. CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES 1945–
1968 187 (1989).
37. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–87 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that the
lack of legislative history means that the sex provision does not forbid discrimination based on
transsexuality); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46 (holding that Title VII’s sex provision does not protect
against discrimination because of pregnancy); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
386 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that there is little legislative history to assist courts with the judicial
interpretation of the sex provision).
38. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that
the sole purpose of Title VII is to ensure the equal treatment of men and women because “[c]ongress
has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning”); see also
De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979).
39. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 n.4; see also Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
40. See discussion infra Section I.B.
41. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 622 n.4; see City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (maintaining that actions based on sex stereotypes are discriminatory);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that distinctions based on sex
may not be discriminatory if they are relevant to “bona fide occupational qualification[s]”); Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386, 388–89 (5th Cir. 1971) (indicating that the
law was intended to fight prejudices based on sex, so the qualifications that discriminate must be
“necessary to the business”).
42. 400 U.S. 542, 543, 547 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“When performance
characteristics of an individual are involved, even when parental roles are concerned, employment
opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the
applicant.”).
43. Id. at 543 (majority opinion).
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The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s anti-sex discrimination provisions were
applicable to an employer’s refusal to accept applications from women, but not
men.44
Similarly, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,45 a man applied for
a position as a flight attendant with Pan American Airlines. He was not selected
based on Pan American’s policy of only hiring women for the flight attendant
position.46 The court held that Title VII protections applied to men as well as
women.47 Soon after Phillips and Diaz, the Supreme Court in City of Los
Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,48 delineated what
discrimination “because of” one’s sex is under the statute. The Court wrote:
There are both real and fictional differences between women and
men. It is true that the average man is taller than the average woman;
it is not true that the average woman driver is more accident prone than
the average man. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an
employer could fashion his personnel policies on the basis of
assumptions about the differences between men and women, whether
or not the assumptions were valid.
It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere “stereotyped” impressions about the
characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual
assumptions about a woman’s inability to perform certain kinds of
work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified
individuals, or for paying them less.49
1.

Courts Slowly Expand the Definition of “Because of Sex”

Following this case, courts slowly began to expand the definition of
“because of sex” discrimination under Title VII. One of the first cases to
attempt to expand this definition was the 1984 case, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.50 Kenneth Ulane was an Eastern Airlines pilot for over 10 years before he
was fired after he underwent sex reassignment surgery and became Karen
Ulane.51 After her surgery, Ulane received a revised birth certificate indicating
her sex as female, and the Federal Aviation Administration certified her for
flight status as a female.52 The airline was unaware of Ulane’s transsexuality
44. Id. at 544.
45. 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that “[i]n attempting to read Congress’ intent
in these circumstances . . . it is reasonable to assume, from a reading of the statute itself, that one
of Congress’ main goals was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and women”).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 388–89.
48. 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978).
49. Id. at 707.
50. 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–87 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 1082–83.
52. Id. at 1083.
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until she tried to return to work after her surgery.53 After she was discharged in
1981, Ulane filed suit against Eastern Airlines alleging that it violated Title VII
because she was discriminated against both as a female and as a transsexual.54
The federal district court found that Ulane was fired because she was a
transsexual in violation of Title VII.55 The district court indicated that while the
term “sex” did not incorporate “sexual preference[,]” it did incorporate “sexual
identity.”56
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.57 The
Seventh Circuit noted that while some may find that “sex” means “sexual
identity[,]” under the principle of statutory construction, words should be given
their plain, ordinary meaning.58 The court highlighted that in Title VII, the
plain, ordinary meaning of “sex” is that “it is unlawful to discriminate against
women because they are women and against men because they are men.”59 The
court also noted that:
The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person
who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body
who believes himself to be female, or a person born with a female
body who believes herself to be male; a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sexual
identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were born.
The dearth of legislative history on section 2000e–2(a)(1) strongly
reinforces the view that that section means nothing more than its plain
language implies.60
The court further concluded that if Eastern Airlines discriminated against
Ulane, it was not because she was female, but because she was a transsexual,
which is not a violation of Title VII.61 Though this case did not successfully
expand the definition of “because of sex[,]” it was subsequently expanded to
include sexual harassment.62

53. Id.
54. Id. at 1082.
55. Id. at 1084.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1087.
58. Id. at 1085.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1085–86 (stating that “[c]ongress never considered nor intended that this 1964
legislation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex” and “sex should be given a
narrow, traditional interpretation . . . ”).
61. Id. at 1087.
62. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72–73 (1986).
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2. Discrimination “Because of Sex” Includes Sexual Harassment
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that sexual
harassment was discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.63 Mechelle
Vinson was an employee of Meritor Savings Bank where she was sexually
harassed by an executive of the bank.64 She was discharged for “excessive
absenteeism” after she took sick leave because of the harassment she
experienced.65 Following her discharge, Vinson brought a Title VII action
against both Taylor and the bank, alleging that Taylor harassed her because of
her sex.66 The EEOC guidelines specified that “sexual harassment . . . is a form
of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.”67 Relying on those guidelines,
the Court held that Title VII affords employees protection from sexual
harassment.68 The Court also noted that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’
on the basis of sex.”69 Just a few years after Vinson, the Court seemed to
embrace similar logic as the district court in Ulane, finding that “sex”
necessarily included “sexual identity.”70
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,71 Ann Hopkins was a senior manager in an
accounting firm who was denied partnership because other partners thought she
did not act how a woman should act. Several partners suggested that she was
“overly aggressive, unduly harsh,” “macho[,]” and that she “overcompensated
for being a woman.”72 The partners also expressed that she would have a better
chance at partnership if she were “to take a course at charm school . . . ,” “walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”73 The Court held that the firm
discriminated against Hopkins because of “sex” as the partners engaged in “sex
stereotyping.”74 The Court stated that:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 64.
See id.; Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
490 U.S. 228, 231–32, 237–38 (1989).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 257–58.
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the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.”75
After Price Waterhouse, more courts began to recognize Title VII protections
in cases of sex stereotyping.76 Courts also began to acknowledge that
discrimination because of “sex” could be perpetrated by someone of the same
sex.77
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,78 Joseph Oncale worked on
an eight-man oil platform crew. After Oncale was forcibly subjected to
humiliating sex-related actions by colleagues in the presence of the rest of the
crew, including physical assaults in a sexual manner and threats of rape, he filed
a claim of sex discrimination against his employer.79 The Court found that
nothing in Title VII prevents one from bringing a claim of discrimination
because of sex when both parties are of the same sex.80 In the unanimous
opinion, Justice Scalia defended the Court’s interpretation of the statute by
noting that:
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.81
Though this case did not expand the definition of “sex” to include sexual
orientation, many cases were filed and tried on that basis.82 However, courts
were still reluctant to grant judgment in favor of plaintiffs because several other
courts held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.83
Further, Congress had neither added sexual orientation as a protected trait nor
defined discrimination because of “sex” to include sexual orientation
discrimination.84

75. Id. at 251.
76. Arthur S. Leonard, Sexual Minority Rights in the Workplace, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 145, 153–
58 (2004/2005).
77. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
78. 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 79.
81. Id.
82. Leonard, supra note 76, at 152–53.
83. Id. “[C]ourts having unanimously concluded that sexual orientation discrimination . . . is
not covered by Title VII . . . tend to reject those harassment cases that are premised solely on antigay motives.” Id.
84. Velma Cheri Gay, “50 Years Later . . . Still Interpreting the Meaning of ‘Because of Sex’
Within Title VII and Whether It Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination”, 73 A.F. L. REV. 61,
93 (2015).
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C. EEOC’s Interpretation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under Title
VII
Much like the courts, until recently, EEOC decisions uniformly ruled that
sexual orientation discrimination was not prohibited sex discrimination under
Title VII.85 Appeals heard by the Commission based on sexual orientation
before 2015 were routinely dismissed for failure to state a claim.86
1. Before 2015: EEOC Says Sexual Orientation Not Protected under Title
VII
In Morrison v. Department of the Navy,87 Richard Morrison filed a complaint
with the agency alleging discrimination based on his sex when his male coworker told other employees he was gay; someone in the parking lot had seen
him making out in a car with a man; and he was dying from AIDS.88 The agency
dismissed the complaint and Morrison requested EEOC’s reconsideration of the
decision.89 The EEOC found that sex discrimination under Title VII did “not
apply to cases which raise issues regarding an individual’s perceived sexual
preference or orientation.”90 The EEOC also noted that “[t]he federal courts
have clearly expressed their opinion that claims of sex discrimination brought
by homosexuals or those individuals perceived as homosexuals, are not within
the purview of Title VII.”91 Similarly, in Angle v. Department of Agriculture,
the EEOC found that Angle’s claim of discrimination because of his perceived
sexual orientation was not a valid claim under Title VII.92 For this reason,
plaintiffs could not successfully pursue a sexual orientation discrimination claim
unless they “failed to conform to gender stereotypes.”93
2. 2015: EEOC Reverses Course—Sexual Orientation Now Protected
under Title VII
In 2015, however, the EEOC reversed course on its longstanding history of
agreeing with the courts in Baldwin v. Foxx.94 David Baldwin filed a formal
85. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *8, *11–12.
86. See Gay, supra note 84, at 106.
87. No. 05930964, 1994 WL 746296, at *1 (June 16, 1994).
88. Id.
89. Id. at *1–2.
90. Id. at *3.
91. Id.; see De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979); see also,
Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
92. Angle v. Veneman, No. 01A32644, 2004 WL 764265, at *2 (Apr. 5, 2004). The EEOC
has consistently held that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title
VII. See also, Barbagallo v. Henderson, No. 01980167, 2001 WL 802788, at *3 (July 5, 2001);
Marucci v. Caldera, No. 01982644, 2000 WL 1637387, at *1 (Oct. 27, 2000).
93. Camille Patti, Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College: Losing the Battle but Winning the
War for Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Protection, 26 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 133,
136 (2017).
94. No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *1 (July 16, 2015).
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complaint with the EEOC against his employer, alleging that he was not
promoted to a full-time air traffic controller at the Miami International Airport
because he is gay.95 Despite the consensus among the federal circuit courts that
Title VII did not cover sexual orientation discrimination, the EEOC issued an
opinion recognizing that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination,
and therefore within the scope of Title VII.96 The EEOC found that “‘[s]exual
orientation’ as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to
sex.”97
The EEOC reasoned that Title VII protects against sexual orientation
discrimination for three reasons: (1) “because it necessarily entails treating an
employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex[;]”98 (2) “because it is
associational discrimination on the basis of sex[;]”99 and (3) because it involves
gender stereotyping, which has already been declared to be sex
discrimination.100 The EEOC also noted an inherent discrepancy in the courts
definition of “sex” under Title VII.101 Courts routinely had held that Congress
in 1964 did not intend Title VII to apply to sexual orientation; yet in Oncale, the
Supreme Court found that statutory provisions can be legitimately stretched,
even absent congressional action, to cover “reasonably comparable evils.”102
Since Baldwin, the EEOC has updated its guidance to include the prohibition of
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.103
95. Id. at *2.
96. Id. at *10.
97. Id. at *13. “Sexual orientation refers to the sex of those to whom one is sexually and
romantically attracted.” Id. (quoting Definitions Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Diversity in APA Documents, APA, http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2018)). “It follows, then, that sexual orientation is inseparable from and
inescapably linked to sex and, therefore, that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination
involve sex-based considerations. One can describe this inescapable link between allegations of
sexual orientation discrimination and sex discrimination in a number of ways.” Id. at *14.
98. Id.
For example, assume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a
photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk. The lesbian employee in that
example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that the employer
would not have taken had she been male. That is a legitimate claim under Title VII that
sex was unlawfully taken into account in the adverse employment action.
Id. at 14–15.
99. Id. at *17. The EEOC determined that since “Title VII ‘on its face treats each of the
enumerated categories’—race, color, religion, sex, and national origin —’exactly the same[,]’”
associational sex discrimination should also be prohibited. Id. at *19.
100. Id. at *20.
101. Id. at *24.
102. Id. at *25.
103. What You Should Know About EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT
Workers,
EQUAL
EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2018).
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D. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Interpretation of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination under Title VII
While the EEOC has made the effort to expand the definition of “sex” to
include sexual orientation, most federal appellate courts have not followed
suit.104 The courts readily acknowledge that it is tough to make a distinction
between sex and sexual orientation; nevertheless, they separate sexual
orientation claims into two categories.105
1.

Gender Stereotyping

The first category is sex discrimination based on gender stereotyping, in
which courts have held there is Title VII protection.106 Following the decision
in Price Waterhouse, plaintiffs have a better chance of surviving summary
judgment on this type claim.
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that
a male waiter had a cognizable sex discrimination claim after he was harassed
by his male coworkers, who teased that he walked and carried his tray “like a
woman,” called him by female pronouns, and insulted him with vulgar female
terms, all because he did not conform to the stereotypical notions of a man.107
The Eighth Circuit similarly held that a front desk clerk with a “slightly more
masculine” and “tomboyish” appearance survived summary judgment when she
was fired despite great performance, because she did not have the “pretty, . . .
Midwestern girl look” that her new supervisor wanted.108
2.

Sexual Orientation Discrimination

The second category is sexual orientation discrimination where it is held that
there is no protection under Title VII.109 The facts in these cases are usually

104. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding
that almost all circuits have defined “sex” in the same way) (citations omitted); Kalich v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285,
290 (3d Cir. 2009); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005); Medina v.
Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112
F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir.
1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
105. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination Under Title VII, PRACTICAL LAW
LABOR & EMP’T, Practice Note W-007-8106.
106. Id.
107. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that an openly
gay employee survived a motion to dismiss when he was harassed by his supervisor, who perceived
him to be effeminate and submissive).
108. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1036, 1041 (8th Cir. 2010).
109. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination Under Title VII, supra note 105.
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analogous to the claims in the gender stereotype cases, yet plaintiffs generally
do not survive summary judgment based on precedent.110
In Simonton v. Runyon, a male postal worker filed suit under Title VII after
suffering repeated abuse and harassment from his co-workers, who were aware
of his sexual orientation.111 The Second Circuit dismissed Simonton’s
complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.112 Likewise, in Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp., the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that discharge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII when an employee in the customer
account department filed a suit for wrongful termination based on his sexual
preferences.113
Much like the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit also found
“harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference or orientation (and
not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”114 In
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a male nurse’s Title VII claim alleging he was fired
because he filed a grievance for harassment based on his sexual orientation.115
In Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., a utility employee’s claim of sexual orientation
discrimination was dismissed because the court held the problems that “resulted
from his . . . apparent homosexuality” were not protected under Title VII.116
3. The Seventh Circuit is the First Circuit to Reverse Course on Sexual
Orientation Discrimination
Since 2000, the Seventh Circuit has relied on both Hamner and Spearman as
precedent to hold that “harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual
preference or orientation (and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII.”117 In 2017, the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
110. See id.
111. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2000). Simonton was routinely verbally
assaulted with comments such as “go fuck yourself, fag,” “suck my dick,” and “so you like it up
the ass?” Id. Notes were placed on the wall in the employees’ bathroom with Simonton’s name
and the name of celebrities who had died of AIDS. Id. Pornographic photographs were taped to
his work area, male dolls were placed in his vehicle, and copies of Playgirl magazine were sent to
his home. Id. Pictures of an erect penis were posted in his work place, as were posters stating that
Simonton suffered from mental illness as a result of “bung hole disorder.” Id. There were repeated
statements that Simonton was a “fucking faggot.” Id.
112. Id. at 36; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
113. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
114. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000).
115. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 704, 708.
116. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1082, 1085.
117. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084; Hamner, 224 F.3d at 704. Both the Hamner and Spearman
courts relied upon the Seventh Circuit’s 1984 case Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., which stated in
dicta that “homosexuals and transvestites do not enjoy Title VII protection.” Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (supporting the
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heard and dismissed sexual orientation discrimination claims.118 The Seventh
Circuit became the first circuit to follow the EEOC in reversing its stance on
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.119 The other circuits, as well
as the U.S. Department of Justice, continue to insist that Title VII does not
provide protection for sexual orientation discrimination claims.120
II. BUT DOES “SEX” MEAN SEXUAL ORIENTATION?
A.

Federal Courts of Appeals’ Split Over Whether “Sex” Includes Sexual
Orientation

1.

Eleventh Circuit: Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital

In 2015, Jameka Evans, a security officer at Georgia Regional Hospital
(Georgia Regional), was “denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically
assaulted or battered.”121 Evans alleged that the chief of security repeatedly
closed a door on her in a rude manner, that she experienced scheduling issues
and a shift change, and that a less qualified individual was promoted as her
supervisor.122 She also claimed that her new supervisor scrutinized and harassed
her and that someone had tampered with her equipment.123 When Evans filed a
complaint to human resources about the harassment, the senior human resources
manager conducting the internal investigation asked her about her “sexuality.”124
Evans then filed a complaint against Georgia Regional alleging that she was
discriminated against because of her sexual orientation.125
Evans believed she was targeted for termination based on her sex because she
is a “gay female” and does not carry herself in a “traditional woman[ly]
manner.”126 Evans also provided that it is “‘evident’ that she identif[ies] with
conclusion that Title VII was meant to apply to discrimination against women because of their sex
(citing Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085)); Hamner, 224 F.3d at 704, 707 (empowering the holding that
sexual orientation is not a classification protected under Title VII) (citing Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085).
118. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017), rehearing en banc,
883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower court’s verdict in favor of the defendants);
Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2017) (reversing the lower
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims, but affirming the lower court’s judgment in all other
respects); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming the lower
court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims in part, and vacating and remanding in part); Hively v. Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s claims despite criticism from the legislative body).
119. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
120. See Zarda, 855 F.3d at 82; Anonymous, 852 F.3d at 200–01; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250;
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *33.
121. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250–51.
122. Id. at 1250.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1250–51.
126. Id. at 1251.
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the male gender[] because she present[s] herself” as such by wearing a “male
uniform, low male haircut, shoes, etc.”127 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
dismissal of the case holding that binding precedent set forth in Blum foreclosed
sexual orientation claims under Title VII.128 The court offered no additional
reasoning why sex does not include sexual orientation; however, it held that sex
does include gender non-conformity.129 In this case, the EEOC, supporting
Evans, argued that the statement in Blum concerning the viability of a sexual
orientation claim “is dicta and not binding precedent.”130 The court disagreed
with the EEOC, noting the statement in Blum directly addressed the sexual
orientation claim and was not dicta.131
Evans and the EEOC also argued that the Supreme Court decisions in Price
Waterhouse and Oncale support a finding that sexual orientation discrimination
is covered under Title VII, but this was not persuasive to the court.132 It noted
that even if claims for gender non-conformity and same-sex discrimination can
be brought under Title VII, that does not allow them to depart from Blum and
find that sexual orientation is actionable.133 The court also reasoned that “Price
Waterhouse and Oncale are neither clearly on point nor contrary to Blum[,]” nor
do they specifically address whether sexual orientation discrimination is
prohibited by Title VII.134 Therefore, it analyzed “that Blum is binding
precedent that has not been overruled by a clearly contrary opinion of the
Supreme Court or of this Court sitting en banc.”135

127. Id.
128. Id. at 1255; see Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th
Cir. 2014) (noting “[u]nder our prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a binding precedent in
this Circuit ‘unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court’”); see
also Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that “[d]ischarge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII or Section 1981”).
129. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1254–55 (holding that “the lower court erred because a gender nonconformity claim is not ‘just another way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,’ but
instead, constitutes a separate, distinct avenue for relief under Title VII”).
130. Id. at 1254; see also Blum, 597 F.2d at 938 (holding that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality
is not prohibited by Title VII or Section 1981”).
131. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255 (noting that “[e]ven if Blum is read as disposing of the sexual
orientation claim for another reason, an alternative reason does not render as dicta this Court’s
holding that there is no sexual orientation action under Title VII”).
132. Id. at 1256.
133. Id.; see also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the court
is bound by prior holdings, quoting precedent that “[w]hile an intervening decision of the Supreme
Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court, the Supreme Court decision must be
clearly on point”); NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating “[w]ithout
a clearly contrary opinion of the Supreme Court or of this court sitting en banc, we cannot overrule
a decision of a prior panel of this court”).
134. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1256.
135. Id.
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2. Second Circuit: Zarda v. Altitude Express Inc.
In 2010, a couple purchased tandem skydives at Altitude Express, a type of
skydiving where the instructor is tied to the back of the client during the jump.136
Donald Zarda, the instructor for the female client, informed her that he was gay
to ease any discomfort because he was strapped tightly to her.137 After the
couples skydived, the male client called Altitude Express to complain about
Zarda’s behavior.138 Zarda was fired shortly thereafter.139 Zarda alleged that
“he was fired from his job as a skydiving instructor because of his sexual
orientation.”140
He sued his former employer, Altitude Express, asserting the discrimination
he faced was in violation of Title VII.141 The district court held that the
“defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Zarda’s Title VII claim
because Second Circuit precedent holds that Title VII does not protect against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”142 In his appeal, Zarda requested
the Second Circuit to revisit the precedent set in Simonton, but the court
declined.143 Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit affirmed
dismissal of his case offering no additional analysis beyond its binding
precedent.144 The court further noted that while his sexual orientation claim was
not protected, a gender-nonconformity claim could have been pursued since that
is actionable under Title VII.145
3.

Seventh Circuit: Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College

Kimberly Hively, an adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College,
applied for several full-time positions at the college over the course of five
years.146 Despite having never received a negative evaluation as an adjunct and
being qualified for a full-time position, the school rejected Hively’s applications
without giving her an interview.147 The school then refused to renew her parttime contract.148 Subsequently, Hively filed a sexual orientation discrimination
136. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76, 80 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 79.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 80–81 (reasoning that the three-judge panel lacks the power to overturn the circuit
precedent).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 82.
146. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *1 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Hively I].
147. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Hively II].
148. Id.
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claim against the school alleging that she was denied employment because of
her sexual orientation.149
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed
the claim citing circuit precedent that “sexual orientation is not recognized as a
protected class under Title VII.”150 Hively appealed, but the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the dismissal of the claim was proper as
claims for sexual orientation are beyond the scope of Title VII.151 However,
unlike the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Seventh Circuit offered an analysis
beyond circuit precedent.152
a. EEOC’s Baldwin Decision Prompts in Depth Look at “Because of
Sex”
The EEOC’s Baldwin decision prompted the Seventh Circuit to take a more
comprehensive look at discrimination “because of sex.”153 The court began its
analysis by noting there is an inconsistency in the court system resulting from
recognition that discrimination because of sex includes gender non-conformity
but not sexual orientation claims.154 The court then acknowledged the difficulty
courts have in separating the two types of claims.155 The court explained that
“Title VII protects gay, lesbian, and bisexual people, but frequently only to the
extent that those plaintiffs meet society’s stereotypical norms about how gay
men or lesbian women look or act” but those “who otherwise conform to gender
stereotyped norms in dress and mannerisms mostly lose their claims for sex
discrimination under Title VII.”156 Because the distinction in “sex” is difficult

149. Hively I, 2015 WL 926015, at *1.
150. Id. at *3.
151. Hively II, 830 F.3d at 699–701.
152. See generally id. at 699–713 (considering the EEOC’s recent decision along with
decisions from other circuit courts).
153. Id. at 702.
154. Id. at 704.
155. Id. at 704–05, 709 (7th Cir. 2016); see Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285,
291 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination
‘because of sex’ can be difficult to draw.”); see also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211,
217 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is often difficult to discern when [the plaintiff] is alleging that the various
adverse employment actions allegedly visited upon her by [her employer] were motivated by
animus toward her gender, her appearance, her sexual orientation, or some combination of these”
because “the borders [between these classes] are so imprecise . . . .”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk
Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 n.5 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that distinguishing between
failure to adhere to sex stereotypes (a sexual stereotyping claim permissible under Title VII) and
discrimination based on sexual orientation (a claim not covered by Title VII) may be difficult. This
is especially true in cases in which a perception of homosexuality itself may result from an
impression of nonconformance with sexual stereotypes.”); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403,
408 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he line between discrimination because of sexual orientation and
discrimination because of sex is hardly clear.”).
156. Hively II, 830 F.3d at 711.
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to make, it leads to inconsistent decisions.157 Despite identifying the
inconsistent results from the current definition of sex and the overlap between
sexual orientation and gender non-conformity, the court refused to change its
stance.158 Instead, the court simply acknowledged the EEOC’s position on
sexual orientation after Baldwin and reasoned that absent a congressional
amendment or Supreme Court action, only its own precedent was binding.159
Not satisfied with the results of the appeal, Hively petitioned for and was granted
a rehearing en banc.160
b. En Banc Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit Reverse Their Holdings
Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit, relying on the same analysis of the threejudge panel, reversed its holding and circuit precedent, becoming the first
appellate court to split with other circuits.161 The en banc court first noted that
determining whether actions taken “because of sex” included sexual orientation
was a question of statutory interpretation within its purview.162 The court
expressed that it could not simply rely on the legislative history when the
Supreme Court has added to the definition of sex discrimination.163 Finding that
no line exists between the gender nonconformity claims and those based on
sexual orientation, the court accepted the argument that sexual orientation
discrimination is sex discrimination.164
Following the reversal of Hively, the Second Circuit agreed to rehear Zarda
en banc.165 The Second Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in the current split by
157. Id. at 705.
158. Id. at 703, 718.
159. Id. at 703.
160. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 15-1720, 2016 WL 6768628, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 11,
2016).
161. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 350–52 (7th Cir. 2017).
162. Id. at 344–45. The court stated “[o]ur interpretive task is guided instead by the Supreme
Court’s approach in the closely related case of Oncale, where it had this to say as it addressed the
question whether Title VII covers sexual harassment inflicted by a man on a male victim:”
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule
excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. As some courts
have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and
it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because
of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory
requirements.
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)).
163. Id. at 344–45.
164. Id. at 346.
165. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2nd Cir. 2017), overruled by, Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
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“conclud[ing] that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part,
by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination.”166 After the rehearing was
granted, the EEOC and DOJ both weighed in on the sexual orientation
discrimination case; however, they fell on opposite sides, creating yet another
split.167
B.

Federal Agencies Split Over Whether “Sex” Includes Sexual Orientation

1. EEOC: There Can Be No Sexual Orientation Discrimination Without
Considering “Sex”
The EEOC, the executive agency charged by Congress with interpreting and
enforcing Title VII, weighed in on the Zarda appeal in support of finding that
sexual orientation is discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.168 In its
brief, the EEOC argued that sexual orientation discrimination claims necessarily
involve impermissible consideration of a plaintiff’s sex, gender-based
associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping.169 The EEOC notes that
sexual orientation discrimination requires the employer to take the employee’s
sex, as well as the sex of his or her partners, into account, which is exactly what
Title VII prohibits.170
Further, it asserted that sexual orientation discrimination treats individuals
differently based on the sex of those with whom they associate, similar to
individuals who face discrimination based on the race of their partners, which
has been held to be a violation of Title VII.171 Much like the en banc Seventh
Circuit, the EEOC also argued that sexual orientation discrimination should be
prohibited because those claims are “at heart based on gender stereotypes” and
trying to separate the two is “unworkable and leads to absurd results.”172
However, the DOJ took the opposite position of the EEOC, despite the fact that
both are executive agencies.173

166. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (reversing the longstanding precedent of Simonton and Dawson following the analyses of the Seventh Circuit in Hively
and the EEOC in its amicus brief).
167. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *1 (submitting that
the court should reaffirm its precedent); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at
*1 (stating that these claims fall within Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of sex).
168. Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at *1.
169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *7–8; see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir.
2017) (Posner, J., concurring) (“Fundamental to the definition of homosexuality is the sexual
attraction to individuals of the ‘same sex.’ . . . One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality
without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render ‘same’ and ‘own’ meaningless.”).
171. Brief of Amicus Curiae EEOC, supra note 12, at *13–20.
172. Id. at *13, 20.
173. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *22–23.
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2. DOJ: The EEOC is Wrong and Does Not Speak for the United States
The DOJ weighed in because it is tasked with enforcing Title VII against state
and local government employers and has a “substantial and unique interest in
the proper interpretation of Title VII.”174 In its brief, the DOJ began by asserting
that “the EEOC is not speaking for the United States and its position about the
scope of Title VII is entitled to no deference beyond its power to persuade.”175
It then set forth three arguments why sexual orientation discrimination is not
discrimination because of sex in violation of Title VII.176 The first argument
asserts that sex discrimination is not prohibited unless men and women are
treated unequally.177 The DOJ provided that the word “sex” means male or
female and “sex discrimination” under Title VII means that similarly situated
employees of different sexes are treated differently.178 Therefore, unless
employers discriminate between members of one sex and “similarly situated”
members of the opposite sex, there is no violation under Title VII.179 Similar to
the Eleventh Circuit, the DOJ’s second argument was primarily based on
precedent.180 It asserted that the long history of not protecting sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII, as well as congressional inaction in adding sexual
orientation to the definition of “because of sex,” necessarily means that the
definition should not be expanded.181 Finally, it argued that the reasoning
advanced by the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit is not persuasive enough to
overcome Congress’s inaction in this case.182
III. “BECAUSE OF SEX” SHOULD INCLUDE SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A.

How Statutory Interpretation of “Sex” Should Have Evolved

Since Title VII was passed more than 50 years ago as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, societal attitudes regarding sexuality have evolved dramatically.183
Activists from the LGBT community as well as their allies have worked
tirelessly to advocate for equality, tolerance, and inclusion in our society. While
there has been some progress toward equality for the LGBT community,
protection under Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination has
not made significant progress. Since Title VII’s enactment, courts and federal
agencies relied upon the plain meaning of sex, the lack of legislative history,
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id.
176. See id. at *2–22.
177. Id. at *2–6.
178. Id. at *2–4.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *4–21.
181. Id. at *6–15.
182. Id. at *15–21.
183. 1964,
EQUAL
EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
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congressional intent, and “precedent” to hold that discrimination “because of
sex” does not include sexual orientation discrimination.184 Over time, the courts
expanded the definition of “because of sex” to include sexual harassment, gender
non-conformity, and same-sex sexual harassment,185 but after Oncale, the courts
should have also expanded the definition to protect against sexual orientation
discrimination.
When Title VII was enacted, it is said that the legislators were not considering
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.186 However, the Supreme Court
asserted that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [the law
was passed to address] to cover reasonably comparable evils.”187 When looking
at the number of cases filed in federal courts by employees for pervasive
discrimination based on their sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation,
it is clear that sexual orientation discrimination is an evil that should be protected
against. Instead, there is an apparent unwillingness to acknowledge sexual
orientation discrimination beyond discussing how precedent prohibits review of
these claims. Further, deeply held biases against homosexuality have allowed
for very limited protection for LGBT employees.
B. Why the EEOC, Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit Got It Right
The EEOC, the Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit all took the position that
it was time to stop allowing employers to discriminate against employees based
on their sexual orientation.188 This was the right decision for several reasons.
Discrimination itself has negative consequences for employees including, but
not limited to, financial instability, decreased morale and productivity, and the
creation of physical and mental issues.189 By restricting LGBT individuals from
bringing forth claims of sexual orientation discrimination, courts allow
employers to inflict those consequences on LGBT individuals without
repercussions.
184. See, eg., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-22290, 192 WL 5436, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992)
(“[W]e believe that only discrimination based on being male or female is prohibited by Title VII,
and that the cases proscribing hostile environment sexual harassment are not to the contrary, we
affirm the district court.”); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) (holding
that a complaint did not state a cause of action because Title VII focused on discrimination because
of the status of sex or because of sexual stereotyping, rather than on discrimination due to a change
in sex).
185. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
186. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 11, at *10.
187. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (holding that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII).
188. See supra Sections I.C.2, II.A.3, II.A.3.b.
189. See generally Wizsom Powell Hammond et al., Workplace Discrimination and
Depressive Symptoms: A Study of Multi-Ethnic Hospital Employees, 2 RACE & SOC. PROBLEMS 19
(2010) (studying the effects of workplace discrimination on hospital employees); Neslie A.
Etheridge, Effects of Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S ARMY (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.army.mil/article/142799/effects_of_discrimination_in_the_workplace.
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No one should have to live and work in fear of discrimination for who they
are. Yet LGBT employees are often unable to be themselves and must hide their
lives while at work out of fear that they may face adverse actions without legal
recourse. By finding that sexual orientation is discrimination because of sex, the
EEOC, Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit have opened an avenue previously
foreclosed to the LGBT community. This provides an opportunity for members
of the LGBT community to seek and receive relief when they suffer adverse
employment actions.
C. The Battle of the Agencies Could Muddy the Waters
Generally speaking, the Executive branch agencies are expected to be in sync.
Yet the EEOC and DOJ oppose one another in defining what is discrimination
“because of sex” under Title VII in regards to sexual discrimination. Both
agencies are tasked with enforcement of Title VII,190 so the differing opinions
lead to the potential for confusion in deciding future claims of sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII.
Some states have enacted laws that protect LGBT individuals from sexual
orientation discrimination.191 However, there are still states that do not
subscribe to equality for the LGBT community.192 Without further guidance,
there will likely be courts subscribing to the EEOC’s definition and others to the
DOJ’s definition. This will likely lead to more inconsistent court opinions, much
like the inconsistent gender non-conformity claims. For this reason, guidance is
needed from Congress or the Supreme Court.
In the past, members of Congress tried repeatedly to enact legislation to
protect employees from sexual orientation discrimination, but the attempts
failed.193 Instead of attempting to enact separate legislation, Congress should
explicitly define sex to include sexual orientation to eliminate any confusion in
the courts. Yet Congress’s history of inaction in this area makes it unlikely that
it will weigh in. However, the Supreme Court has acted to eliminate
discrimination faced by the LGBT community, and should act further to
eliminate any confusion and resolve the definition of sex.194

190. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258, 259 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
191. Sexual Orientation Discrimination, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://www.w
orkplacefairness.org/sexual-orientation-discrimination#3 (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
192. See id.
193. William C. Sung, Note, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining
“Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 487, 495–98 (2011) (tracing the history of the legislation attempting to address
employment discrimination, in particular the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equality Act of 1974,
and the Employment Non-Discrimination Act).
194. Christianna Silva, All the Times the Supreme Court Has Ruled on LGBT Rights,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2017, 2:38 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/all-times-supreme-court-hasruled-lgbt-rights-720883.
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Given the courts progress toward equality for LGBT individuals,195 they
should take the position that sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination
“because of sex.” In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court identified same-sex sexual
intimacy as a fundamental right and recognized that sexual orientation is both
immutable and a “normal expression of human sexuality . . . .”196 Obergefell
lays even more groundwork for the Court to expand the definition of “because
of sex” to protect workers from sexual orientation discrimination. Following its
own guidance, the Court should resolve the split by finding that, despite not
being the evil Congress intended to eradicate, sexual orientation is nevertheless
an evil that should be prohibited under Title VII.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many arguments can be made for why and how the prohibition against
discrimination based on sex should include sexual orientation discrimination.
Because heterosexuality is considered the societal norm, LGBT individuals face
discrimination that generally involves sex stereotyping or gender nonconformity. Following Price Waterhouse, courts allowed gender nonconformity claims to proceed under Title VII. However, courts have tried to
draw a line between distinguishing sex stereotyping or gender non-conformity
claims from sexual orientation claims using sexual orientation as a basis for not
allowing LGBT plaintiffs relief under Title VII. However, as the EEOC,
Seventh Circuit, and Second Circuit have noted, gender non-conformity is at the
root of all sexual orientation claims and, by proxy, discrimination that takes this
into account is discrimination because of sex. As such, the Supreme Court
should allow LGBT individuals access to Title VII as recourse for employment
discrimination because of their sexual orientation.

195. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 747 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635 (1996).
196. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.
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